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Abstract:
The idea to create a new class of place-based visas is gaining traction in policy circles.
These visas, known in some instances as “heartland visas” and as part of a class of
immigration reform called “place-based immigration” (PBI), are designed to give state
and local governments the ability to sponsor immigrants to live and work in their local
communities. The proposal has gained traction among a variety of candidates for federal
office and local immigration policy stakeholders. The reason for this support is the
proposal’s ability to address a grave issue facing numerous communities across the
U.S.—and its ability to do so while appealing to the sentiments and preferences of local
stakeholders. As communities across the U.S. face population decline and aging, the
question of how to maintain the livability and desirability of those communities looms
large. Place-based visas are compelling because they can help communities bolster the
numerical, social, and educational stock of local communities to solve the various
economic and social challenges raised by population decline, like depressed real estate
prices, government revenues, and economic activity. A place-based visa policy would
also contribute to the decentralization of both immigration flows and the immigration
bureaucracy by giving state and local officials the power to bring immigrants to their
less-frequently settled communities. This thesis explores why it is that this visa program
shows promise, but it leaves questions about specific forms of enforcement and
implementation for future studies. Such questions will be important to clarify to protect
local communities from a host of social, political, and economic costs.
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I.
Introduction
During his bid to for the Democratic party nomination during 2020 Presidential
primaries, Pete Buttigieg pitched a little-known idea for how to fix the U.S. immigration
system and revitalize shrinking heartland communities at the same time: create a new
class of place-based visas. These visas, known in some instances as “heartland visas” and
as part of a class of immigration reform called “place-based immigration” (PBI), are
designed to give state and local governments the ability to sponsor immigrants to live and
work in their local communities. As unknown as this proposal is, it gained traction among
a variety of candidates for federal office and local immigration policy stakeholders.
Proponents of the policy include former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg,
current president Joe Biden, the Economic Innovation Group (EIG), the U.S. Conference
of Mayors, and a variety of other local and national policy stakeholders.
The reason for this niche policy’s popularity can be attributed to its potential to
address the ailing and local decline of U.S. cities. Policy and economic proponents of
place-based visas, like the EIG, purport that giving declining cities the opportunity to
sponsor immigrants will allow them to pare back or reverse the negative effects generated
by the hollowing out and aging of their communities. Though the proposal is not featured
prominently in the current immigration debates, it would do policy stakeholders well to
understand what the potential costs and benefits of such a proposal might be.
To help understand what effect a place-based visa policy would have on the
current immigration system, readers must understand the current allocations of visas, the
allocation of the right to immigrate, and which political entities control those allocations.
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Chapter II discusses the bounds of the current immigration system to give readers a better
understanding of how the federal bureaucracy allocates permission to enter the country
and seek permanent residence.
Chapter III highlights the policy history of immigration since 1990 to help the
readers understand what reasons there might be for a dearth of updates to immigration
policy since then. This chapter will attempt to incorporate theories of executive vs.
legislative powers and the incentives to act on immigration for both branches of
government.
Chapter IV provides a sense of what aspects or dimensions of the current
immigration system might be changed by the establishment of a place-based visa scheme.
To help explain what form such a policy might take, this paper will look for similarities
between previously proposed Congressional bills which would establish a place-based
visa, theoretical economic and political writings on decentralization, and research briefs
which recommending the institution of a place-based visa.
Chapter V explores the purported benefits of a place-based visa policy. The
chapter will first highlight the problems faced by U.S. communities experiencing decline,
particularly those in the Heartland. Then, the paper will highlight the findings from key
literature to understand the potential benefits of place-based visas. This review of the
literature will heavily reflect findings from the EIG’s report “Could A Heartland Visa
Help Struggling Regions?” Beyond the economic benefits posited by policy groups like
the EIG, there are theoretical economic and political arguments to make this change
rooted in economic theory about how to best allocate resources and political theory about
the doctrine of federalism. Importantly, this section will also address the question of
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whether place-based economic policies—like a city-level minimum wage—can be
implemented without distorting contiguous labor markets in nearby cities.
Because place-based visas are a newly formulated, untested policy, there are not
many arguments against it. So, instead of looking for nonexistent arguments against a
place-based visa policy, Chapter VI will attempt to make up for the lack of attention—
and subsequent criticism—by reviewing arguments against immigration policies and
place-based economic policies. To do so, this section will review economic and social
science literature about the impact of place-based economic policies and immigration on
the economic health of and sociopolitical activity within local communities. This chapter
ends with a brief discussion about potential political responses to a place-based policy
proposal on the national level.
Chapter VII concludes with a summary of this study’s findings and comments
about still-unanswered issues, such as looming implementation questions about how
place-based visas would be allocated.
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II.
The Current Immigration System
A. The Visa System
To understand what changes a place-based immigration reform might institute, it helps to
understand what the current immigration system does and does not do. The legal
immigration system has a storied history, and it is comprised of a vast network of visas,
the refugee and asylum systems, and a handful of temporary permissions.
Visas comprise the bulk of the legal immigration system. They can take two
forms: 1) temporary, nonimmigrant visas, and 2) immigrant visas. This dichotomy is
meant to distinguish between visas for those who temporarily visit the country on some
specific venture, like tourism, business, or education, and visas for those who are
authorized to enter the country through some family, employment, or diversity visa with
the hope of becoming a permanent resident. Before the COVID-19 Pandemic, the State
Department issued 9.2 million total visas in the 2019 Fiscal Year (FY). Of the total, 8.7
million were nonimmigrant visas while 462 thousand were immigrant visas.
The Migration Policy Institute breaks down the nonimmigrant visa distribution for
Fiscal Year 2020, noting that historical trends in visa volume were greatly disturbed by
the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on global travel. In any case, the three largest
nonimmigrant visa groups were temporary business and tourist visas (B and BCC visa
categories), temporary workers and trainees and their family members (H visa
categories), and academic students and exchange visitors (F and J visa categories). The
percentages of the FY 2020 nonimmigrant visa total for each of these classes were 71
percent, 12 percent, and six percent, respectively.
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There are significantly fewer immigrant visas than non-immigrant visas. The
reasons for this are varying. Simply, the restrictions on admitting immigrants who wish to
live in the country permanently rather than temporarily will naturally be stricter because
the government may wish to set a higher bar for those immigrants who may one day
become citizens. The maximum number of permanent immigrant visas that the US can
issue per year is 675,000. This limitation has been fixed at this level since 1997. This
number is determined by the amended Immigration and Nationality Act numerical visa
limitations. The exception to this numerical limitation on immigrant visas is immediate
family visas used to admit the spouses, parents, and children under the age of 21 of U.S.
citizens. Under the current law, there is no limitation to the number of immediate family
members that can come to the U.S. and seek permanent residency and citizenship. Hence,
visas to immediate family members of legal permanent residents or citizens of the U.S.
can only build on the 675,000 visas limit.
This means, however, that family visas for those who do not fit that unlimited
family reunification criteria, employment visas, and diversity lottery visas are all
restricted by the 675,000 permanent immigrant visa ceiling. Of the 675,000 visas
allocated for permanent immigrants, visas for extended family—that is, family members
that do not fit the immediate family criteria—are subjected to an annual limit of 480,000.
Visas for those who wish to work in the U.S.—and their eligible spouses and minor
children—are limited to 140,000, with a hierarchy prioritizing certain immigrants over
others based on their skills, education, and work prospects in the U.S. relative to nativeborn counterparts. For instance, an immigrant who has a special skill, expertise, or
education that employers in the U.S. are struggling to source from native-born citizens
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will have a higher chance of getting in that an immigrant whose skillsets are common in
the U.S. working population. Finally, the diversity lottery visas have an annual cap of
55,000, of which 5,000 is allocated specifically for use under the Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act program.
The diversity lottery visa was created in 1990 to increase immigration to the U.S.
from countries or regions of the which previously had low immigration rates. Under this
program, 50,000 people are randomly selected out of a pool of vetted applicants and
awarded the diversity visa. This program’s cap has stayed at 50,000 since it was
implemented, except for a boost of 5,000 visas specially made available to those
unsuccessful asylum seekers from El Salvador, Guatemala, and formerly communist
countries in Europe.
While the cap on these permanent immigrant visas has stayed the same, the U.S.
population has gone up by 30.0 percent between 1990 and 2019 while the share of the
U.S. population that is undocumented went from 1.4 to 3.2 percent during that same time.
It must be noted, however, that the share of the U.S. population that was undocumented
in 2019 was actually lower than the 2007 high of 4.1 percent.

B. Humanitarian Programs
The U.S. has a variety of other systems for admitting foreign-born individuals besides its
visa program. The two main humanitarian programs which the U.S. manages are the
refugee and asylum programs. Under the refugee program, the U.S. admits individuals
who are unable to return to their home countries because of a “well-founded fear of
persecution” due to a variety of factors. Usually, prospective refugees will apply to live in
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the U.S. from a “transition” country outside of their home country. This can mean fleeing
from country X to settle down in country Y and then applying for refugee status in the
U.S. from a refugee camp or some other form of temporary residence. The likelihood of
being admitted varies depending on how well individuals can prove that they have a
“well-founded fear of persecution.” This requires demonstrating a substantial risk upon
returning to their home country. Refugees are also more likely to be accepted to the U.S.
if they can prove that there are people in the U.S. who could support them as they
transition into life in the country.
During the past few years, the annual limit for the number of refugees admitted to
the U.S.—a number determined by the President in consultation with Congress—and the
actual admissions rate for refugees have both fallen sharply. In the past five years, the
year when the most refugees had been resettled was in 2016 with 84,995 while the lowest
was 11,814 in 2020. The cap for admitting refugees for that same time had fallen from
84,995 to 18,000. Prior to 2016, since 2000, the cap on refugees has remained relatively
stable, though the actual number of refugees settled has varied. Because of the transition
from the Trump administration to the Biden administration, the cap is expected to rise
once again. Before refugees can successfully be resettled in the U.S., they must be
referred to the U.S. authorities for resettlement consideration and screened and vetted for
an average of nearly two years. If approved for resettlement, the refugees will be
transitioned into life in the U.S. following at least one cultural orientation and with the
help of one of nine domestic resettlement agencies. After a year in the U.S., they would
be allowed to apply for permanent residency.
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The process for asylum is slightly different. Rather than being done in some
transitory country, the asylum process begins at a U.S. port of entry or within one year of
arriving in the U.S. The criteria for applying for asylum is the same as that for applying
as a refugee—the main difference is that asylum seekers have historically been allowed
to stay in the U.S. while waiting for a hearing related to their asylum case. Recently, the
U.S. implemented a policy which required asylum seekers to wait in Mexico or some
other third country while their case was pending. This policy is now being rolled back as
a new presidential administration begins. There is no annual limit to the number of
asylum seekers who may be granted asylum. Asylees, or those who have been granted
asylum, are also eligible to apply for permanent residency one year after settling in the
U.S.

C. Temporary Permissions
The U.S. also implements a handful of temporary immigration programs as a form of
humanitarian relief from the vast immigration bureaucracy. The most famous examples
of these programs include the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programs. These programs are similar in that they have
humanitarian intentions and that they are used as temporary fixes to glaring issues which
the immigration system does not currently address. The first program, TPS, originates in
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. The idea behind the program is to provide
relief from deportation for 6-, 12-, or 18-month periods for foreign nationals whose return
to their home country might be unsafe. TPS is granted based on the country of origin, and
the length of time is determined by an assessment of when it might be safe to return. In
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2020, about 319,000 individuals from ten countries were granted TPS, with the largest
groups being Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Haitians.
The next and possibly most famous example of a humanitarian temporary
permission is the DACA program. Announced in 2012 through executive action, this
program is one such example of an immigration policy which is directed and authorized
by Presidential rather than Congressional power. The program grants a renewable twoyear deportation relief period and work authorization to young undocumented immigrants
who meet various requirements. Because the program is designed to provide relief to
those who came to the U.S. when they had little to no agency under the direction of
parents or guardians, the program only provided relief to those who entered the U.S.
before the age of 16. Dreamers—eligible applicants, named after the Dream Act
legislation championed by Former-President Barack Obama—had to be at least 15 years
old, had to have continuously resided in the U.S. since June 15, 2007, had to be enrolled
in school or have earned a high school diploma or its equivalent, and have a relatively
minimal or no criminal record. As of September 30, 2020, 640,700 individuals had active
DACA status. As of February 24, 2020, there is no path to citizenship for those Dreamers
with active DACA status.

D. Transitioning to Citizenship
The goal of many who immigrate to the United States is to acquire citizenship.
Ostensibly, this is the goal of those who come to the U.S. on permanent immigrant visas,
those 675,000 visas which are allocated by Congress for each year, and those who come
under the unlimited family reunification visas category. For those immigrants on
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permanent visas or others who have a path to citizenship—refugees or asylees—to
become citizens, they must undergo a process called naturalization. A crucial step in this
process and one which confers individuals with many of the same rights afforded to
citizens is the acquisition of lawful permanent residency (LPR), also known as a “green
card.” Once an immigrant has obtained LPR, they must wait at least five years before
applying to become a citizen. An individual applying for citizenship must also be at least
18 years old, demonstrate continuous residency in the U.S., demonstrate “good moral
character,” pass English and U.S. history and civics exams (with certain exceptions), and
pay an application fee, among other requirements. Once a citizen, individuals can also
sponsor immediate and extended family members to bring them to the U.S. and for
citizenship.

Figure 1: Number of Immigrants Granted Lawful Permanent Resident Status since FY 1950;
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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III.
The History of Immigration Policymaking
A. The Policymaking Process
To understand the current immigration debate and the history of immigration, it is
important to understand the policymaking process. Policymaking is largely understood as
a process which involves defining the problem, clarifying solutions and alternatives, and
building support while minimizing opposition for policy solutions to the purported
problems. The ideas broadly involve setting what is called the “policy agenda.” The idea
of the policy agenda is that at any one time there is a list of policy problems which
policymakers and relevant constituents find themselves trying to solve. If an issue is on
the agenda, it does not mean that the general public is violently interested in it—it
generally means that the policy makers who can do something about it are engaged in the
debate about potential solutions—or are at least trying to seem like they are.
On that point, some problems on the policy agenda may not actually be popular or
incredibly public. People might not talk about such issues because, as important as these
theoretical issues can be to the policymakers actively working to address them on behalf
of key constituents, they are either too mundane, complex, non-political, or regular to
warrant public attention. Though policymakers may jockey behind closed doors and in
committee hearings to propose their own alternative solutions to the problems, they may
be issues which are almost guaranteed an outcome of a specific kind. One example of this
is appropriation for military spending—there are likely key constituent groups which pay
attention to it, but the entire military spending package passed every year is not the
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subject of wall-to-wall media coverage and fierce public debate in the same way a bill to
fund alternative energy solutions might be.
Immigration, on the other hand, is one of those issues which lies on the other end
of the spectrum in terms of polarization. Debates over immigration policy today can be
incredibly passionate—at times, even vehement—for several reasons. But it is best not to
jump ahead. How does an issue make it onto the policy agenda to begin with? Thomas
Birkland, in An Introduction to the Policy Process (2016), defined the agenda setting
process as a fierce competition to determine which issues the policy process will be
focused on solving at any given moment. This competition takes place between interest
groups who are interested in bringing their policy solution to the policy issue that they
think is most prominent to the table. Birkland adopts Bachrach and Baratz’s ideas about
power to discuss not only how groups 1) put their issues on the agenda, but also 2) keep
other groups’ issues off the agenda. Ultimately, the process of getting an issue on the
agenda is a competition between various groups to signal to the policymakers why they
should care about and signal that they are trying to solve an issue. This requires groups
to, at the least, socially construct a problem, signal that there are potential solutions, and
communicate that policymakers can solve those problems. An issue making it onto the
agenda is the intersection of multiple elements of what John Kingdon, in Agendas,
Alternatives, and Public Policy (1995), calls the “policy stream.”
Beyond building the idea of the policy stream, Kingdon also details the reasons
for which issues disappear from the policy agenda after being on there. The first reason is
that, whether because policymakers addressed or failed to address the problem, the
requisite stakeholders interested in the problem moved on. The second reason is that the
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conditions which characterized the problem itself might have changed—potentially, it
may not even be a problem anymore. For instance, maybe talk of regulation caused a firm
to clean up their act before they became the subjects of harsh public debate, a move
which would allow them to pre-empt public backlash and save their reputation. The third
possible reason is that the problem itself—even if the conditions have not changed—
either became normalized by the public over time or was re-labeled in a way that no
longer made it seem like a problem. Fourth, the problem could have been crowded out by
other problems that, for whatever reason, became more pressing recipients of a spot on
the policy-makers’ agenda. And, finally, the problem may simply recede from
consideration because attention is cyclical—policymakers and constituent stakeholders
can only pay attention to a single issue for so long before another issue or set of issues
replaces it. A reason which I will add to Kingdon’s theory is that of political exhaustion
in the face of gridlock. In the face of complicated issues in a highly polarized political
environment, it might be possible that policy makers simply give up on reaching the
votes to enact a legislative solution.
So, how does this framework help us understand the immigration policy-making
process?

B. Which Concerns Inform the Immigration Debate?
There are numerous concerns which inform the debate around immigration. I will broadly
sort these concerns under three categories: the national security concerns, the economic
concerns, and the socio-cultural concerns. The first of these, the national security
concerns, is generally focused on the potential threat that immigrants pose to the health
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and well-being of natives in the U.S. Even before the tragedy of September 11, 2001,
there were numerous laws and regulations introduced with the intention of keeping the
U.S. safe not only from maligned international forces which might employ spies or
saboteurs in the U.S.—think, for instance, about the racist internment of Japanese
Americans and immigrants—but also from those immigrants who, by virtue of being
lower-class, would do violence to the socioeconomic standards of local communities and
the U.S. as a whole. A large part of the response to immigration in the late 1800s and
early 1900s was an insistence that low-income immigrants were ruining the quality of
communities in which they were settling by decreasing the overall living standard and
contributing to crime. In a post-September 11 world, immigration restrictionists began to
highlight national security concerns in the global fight against multinational terrorist
movements. Former-President Donald Trump gave a voice to this fear that extremist
terrorists were immigration to the U.S. when he incited panic over the possibility that
Islamic extremists were using the border with Mexico as a gateway into the U.S. and
when his administration ordered a ban on immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.
The economic concerns against over immigration hinges on the views that
immigrants generally compete with native workers and businesses. Particularly, the focus
is on low-skilled immigrants who doubly sin in the eyes of immigration restrictionists
because they are believed to compete with low-skilled natives and reap the rewards of
public benefits. This perception persists even though it can be very hard in some parts of
the country even for legal immigrants to access welfare support. Immigrants are unable to
receive federal public benefits without first spending a minimum of 5 years in the U.S.
and becoming an LPR. Whether immigrants can access state and local public benefits
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depends on local policies. At times, restrictionists even target higher-skilled immigrants
and argue that the admission of these immigrants is putting downward pressure on U.S.based private sector and educational institutions to train and employ native workers.
The last concern this study will discuss is the concern that immigrants do not do
enough to assimilate, and instead change the society and culture of the country without
the consent of natives. This form of exclusion can be racially insidious, and it has been
one of the most persistent concerns of restrictionists. Restrictionists often target
immigrants for their tendency to sponsor family members to come to the U.S. on
reunification visas, a mechanism that results in the creation of large ethnic enclaves that
immigrants use to build support networks for themselves. These enclaves are proof to
restrictionists that immigrants do not try hard enough to assimilate and “become
American,” learn English, and leave behind some of the cultural practices that some
restrictions see as being at odds with life in the U.S. President Trump’s ban on
immigration from Muslim-majority countries was not exclusively or objectively based in
a risk assessment of migration from Muslim-majority countries, and hence also appealed
to concerns over foreign, alien, or “incompatible” cultures infiltrating local communities.
On the other hand, proponents of immigration more broadly oppose many of these
concerns as being unfounded. To many proponents, immigration is a net positive to
society. Some take more policy-oriented approaches to undermine the national security
concerns as unfounded and sing praises for the productive and economic capacity of
immigrants as a whole. Meanwhile, some appeal to the humanitarian sentiments
underlying the idea that the U.S. is a land of opportunity for all.
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C. Background About the Current Immigration Debate
The first thing to understand about the current immigration system is that it is entirely
federal. This can lead to instances where tensions between state and local governments
and federal officials flare up following one-off legislative and enforcement conflicts. The
most famous form of this tension persists when the Executive is controlled by an
immigration restrictionist. When this occurs, the restrictionist Executive frequently
targets so-called “sanctuary cities” or “sanctuary states,” jurisdictions in the United States
which in one form or another refuse to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement
and statutes. In such jurisdictions, local officials regularly and systematically withhold
local resources and knowledge from federal officials. The most popular form of
resistance which has been hotly debated is the refusal to cooperate with federal officials
in the deportations of non-violent undocumented immigrants. Besides these instances of
resistance to federal enforcement, states presently have no authority to create their own
immigration legislation.
That is all to say that the policy debate about immigration reform is settled
squarely in the Legislative Branch, as the Constitution provides Congress with the
ultimate authority to determine the laws around what form the immigration system takes.
So, what has Congress done in recent years to answer the concerns which inform the
immigration debate? How have Senators and Representatives interacted with potential
reforms in the past?
Considering that the last most notable immigration reform was passed in 1990,
with the Immigration Act, it does not seem like immigration has been a productive area
of discussion. There have been other bills passed to address such subjects like
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deportations, criminalizations, and the question of how to handle those suspected of
plotting to commit terrorism in the U.S. However, there has been little legislative action
on the questions of who is allowed into the country, at what rate, or on what grounds. The
conditions for entering the country—as well as the numerical limits determining how
many can enter and the guidelines which clarify the qualifications for entry—have largely
stayed the same. For this reason, many proponents of immigration are interested in
expanding access to visas, addressing long-standing backlogs for providing visas to
immigrants from certain countries, and creating opportunities for non-violent
undocumented immigrants, a non-negligible share of whom were brought to the country
at a young age by their parents. This final issue is a major point of contention right now.
At the same time, restrictionists are currently holding the line on immigration reform by
presenting such concerns as having strong, well-defined, and respected borders, rule of
law at the border and in the country, preserving the socio-cultural stock of society by
bringing in high-quality, “America-loving” immigrants, and protecting natives from
foreign competition.
The proposal that got closest to breaking this legislative dry-spell was S.744 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act. This act
was passed in the Senate with a final vote count of 68 to 32 in 2013 before being rejected
by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. If passed by Congress, the bill
would have provided a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants and enacted
tougher border security provisions. Following the failure of Congress to act on this bill,
then-President Obama used powers provided to him by congress to unilaterally extend
deportation relief to the Dreamers, thereby creating the DACA Program.
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Beyond creating brief outrage over what many saw an abuse of Executive power,
this served to push the immigration debate briefly into the background. Since then, the
United States has revisited the issue of immigration during major elections and any other
time when parties needed to use the highly polarized topic to rally their political
supporters. However, effectively little has changed in the legislative arena. This, in some
ways, is an example of the cyclical nature of problem definition described by Kingdon.
For all the passions surrounding the immigration debate, its time on the policy agenda is
naturally transient—and the impetus for immigration reform to jump back onto the
agenda often depends on political optimism and opportunism of whichever party has
recently taken hold. This is why immigration often emerges as a rallying cry for party
activists around elections—it is an issue that some care about very passionately and party
leaders believe can help them win elections at the margins.
Furthermore, Presidents have sought to function as stand-in legislators to fulfill
immigration campaign promises that they or their party made through unilateral actions
such as executive orders. We have discussed a few examples of this when talking about
Obama’s creation of DACA and Trump’s employment of the Muslim travel ban.
Examples of executive authority over immigration also include Trump’s drastic rollback
of refugee admissions and attempted abolition of the DACA program. The concentration
of power in the Executive also means that when the party switches, drastic executive
actions are almost always capable of being reversed, barring legal challenges. President
Biden has famously spent many of the early days of his presidency rescinding many of
the orders from the Trump presidency—one which has famously been defined by its
desire to roll back and undo any number of Obama-era Executive Orders.
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Ultimately, the overwhelming empowerment of the Executive and reticence of the
Legislative Branch to deliberate and act on the issue of immigration has relegated it to a
partisan campaign rallying cry rather than a conceivably achievable policy dream.
Beyond the disempowerment of the Executive—a move intended to incentivize
legislators to take initiative on the issue of immigration rather than throw their hands up
in dismay and wait for the next election when their party might take power of the White
House—or the overwhelming victory of one party over the other in both the Senate and
the House that could empower that party to unilaterally pass legislation on their own—
there is no clear indication that the current cycle of non-action will meaningfully change.
At the moment, the Legislative Branch is not incentivized to legislate, given how much
power the Executive has on immigration.
Someone might yet ask why legislators cannot simply revive their most successful
legislative actions and try to pick up where they previously left off—for instance, why
can’t the same legislators who led the Senate in 2013 pick up and try to pass the same bill
today? A few important points are necessary to clarify why legislation continues to stall.
For starters, immigration reform is just one item on the national policy agenda, and so it
must be one that the public, legislators, the executive, and any number of other actors, are
actually interested in attending to. Additionally, it is couched in the national political
context of an increasingly partisan public contest between the two major U.S. political
parties. For these reasons, it is hard to believe that those same Senators and
Representatives who voted one way in 2013 will vote the same way now in 2021. Under
the current circumstances where the public and legislators seem more polarized than ever
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before, it has arguably become even tougher than it previously was to pass bipartisan
legislation on a topic like immigration.
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IV.
How Would PBI Change Immigration?
A. What Wouldn’t Place-Based Visas Change?
To understand PBI and its political prospects, we must note what a place-based
immigration policy, specifically the proposal for place-based visas, does not address.
Two of the most publicly contested immigration issues which arose in the aftermath of
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election were the issues of whether to expel undocumented
immigrants and whether to build a U.S.-Mexico border wall. Proponents of PBI reform
ostensibly believe in its legislative potency because it avoids those issues which might be
considered toxic to the prospects of reform. PBI reform’s appeal to would-be
immigration reformers is that it leaves some of the most divisive issues related to
immigration unaddressed. PBI inherently appeals to bipartisan sentiments to appreciate
the contributions of immigrants to society while also presenting PBI reform as a break
from previous, inefficient models of immigration.

B. What Would Place-Based Visas Change?
Now, because PBI reforms come in many forms, we will highlight and explore the
common aspects which repeat between the various PBI policies. The first of these
common aspects is the idea to create a system to match immigrants with state or local
governmental entities which consent to receive the immigrants into their communities.
Though the system for opting in and then receiving immigrants—as well as the system
which determines which immigrants arrive in which states—can vary, the idea among the
many iterations is similar. The Economic Innovation Group (EIG), in their report
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regarding heartland visas, lays out a vision for place-based visas wherein “Both
communities and visa-holders would ‘opt-in’ on a voluntary basis.” There have been two
bills introduced in Congress which advocate for the creation of a similar system. Under
S.1040 of the 115th Congress (2017-2018) and its copy in the House, H.R.5174 of the
116th Congress (2019-2020), the Congress would authorize state-sponsored
nonimmigrant pilot program which would allow states to directly sponsor immigrants to
move to their states. For states with contiguous industries and labor markets, states could
form compacts with one another to jointly sponsor immigrants.
Current conceptions of these place-based visas make them additive to the current
immigration system. This means that the creation and allocation of these visas does not
come at the cost of visas in other categories—for instance, the place-based visas do not
replace employment-based or family-based, temporary or permanent visas. There is no
consensus or dominant reasoning which argues for how or how many visas would be
made available to which states. With that said, S.1040 and H.R.5174 both allocate a
minimum of 5,000 visas for each state for their own use. This scheme also allows, given
that states ensure that enforcement guidelines are not violated, that the number of visas
afforded to every state steadily increases every year.
Another similarity between proposals is the flexibility of the visas in terms of who
is allowed to use them. The idea in creating these visas is that they will not be used to
only to fulfill labor demand just in the healthcare industry—or the construction industry,
service industry, or agriculture industry. They can be used by states to fulfill any labor
demand in any industry that the state sees fit. This can mean sponsoring workers of
variety of skillsets, educational backgrounds, or experiences. Supporters of the proposal
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also point out that visas can even be used to sponsor foreign entrepreneurs to invest in
U.S. communities, something that some high-skilled immigration proponents have sought
after for a long time. Finally, these visas can be used to supplement visas which are
already used to promote high-skilled employment in the U.S., like H1-B visas. With these
extra place-based visas, states could bolster the number of visas available to state and
local employers—potentially in exchange for some fee—to help them meet labor
demands that the local economy and the current immigration system do not satisfy.
As the Cato Institute notes, there is a history of state-level demand for place-based
visas: “Colorado passed a bill to expand agricultural visas in 2008. In 2011, Utah passed
a bill creating a state‐sponsored guest worker visa program and immediately asked the
federal government for permission to run it. In 2015, Texas and California state
legislators introduced numerous bills to create different state‐level guest worker
programs.”
Beyond changing the landscape of the formal immigration system, place-based
visas can also provide incremental change the status quo immigration inflows. Brookings
Institution demographer William Frey talks about this status quo in his book “Diversity
Explosion” when he discusses where most immigrants usually end up arriving. Professor
Frey describes the existence of “gateway communities”: metropolitan centers where
immigrants often first arrive. Frey notes that in these communities, immigrants of similar
ethnic or cultural backgrounds cluster together. This results in the formation of ethnic
enclaves where immigrants of similar ethnic backgrounds live in close proximity and
emulate the lifestyles they had in their home countries. Gateway communities and the
resulting ethnic enclaves can be understood to result from family-reunification policies
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like the unlimited number of permanent visas made available for immediate family
members. Instituting a place-based visa system can empower state and local communities
to which immigrants do not first often arrive to attract and retain a robust immigrant
population. In this way, place-based immigration can change in a small way where
immigrants to the U.S. settle.

C. Varying Conceptions of Place-Based Visas
The numerous similarities between the proposals for place-based visas should not be used
to argue that all the proposals are entirely the same. There are still numerous points of
disagreement over the finer details. Where place-based visa proposals begin to differ is in
their determinations of which states would be eligible to sponsor prospective immigrants.
While some place-based visa proposals allow any state or local governments to sponsor
immigrants, proposals like the one put forth by the EIG champion target visas to those
areas experiencing demographic decline. For this reason, their visas are called “heartland
visas,” because they are designed to empower communities in the U.S. heartland which
are confronting chronic population loss or economic stagnation. Under the EIG proposal,
metropolitan centers in heartland states would also not be a priority—not if those
metropolitan areas are not facing demographic crises, anyway.
The EIG’s proposal is also one that prescribes a more hands-on role for the
federal government once place-based visa immigrants arrive. For one, their proposal
argues that prospective immigrants should be provided federal resources for smooth
assimilation and job matching. This kind of an active role in assisting foreign-born
arrivals to the U.S. is most notably used for refugees and asylees, but not for those
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immigrating with family or employment visas. The Congressional bills previously
mentioned do not outline further resources for place-based visa immigrants—the bills
treat them the same way that they would treat immigrants under any other visa.
The Congressional bills also fail to outline a path to citizenship for place-based
visa recipients that preserves the resources or allocations made under the current
immigration system. By adding this new class of visas without increasing the resources
and allocations required to increase the number of permanent residency changes made
every year, the Congressional bills make it likely that green card backlogs—an issue
which is described by applicants to green cards having to wait incredibly long periods of
time before their applications are approved depending on their country of origin—will
intensify. The green card backlog is a policy concern because of how it affects the
planning and settlement process in the U.S. for immigrants, the hiring process for
employers, and uncertainty for children on visas. The EIG’s policy principles clearly
outline their opinion that a place-based visa policy should include a path to citizenship
that does not constrain or cut from the opportunities available to other immigrants to
receive green cards. This likely means accepting more green card applications every year
and providing more resources to those agencies which handle green card applications.
Some of these new resources will likely be dedicated specifically for allowing helping
place-based visa recipients. However, the vision to support the naturalization process for
place-based immigrants is not universal.

M o s l i m a n i | 26

V.
What are the Potential Benefits of PBI?
A. The Problems at Hand
The Empty Planet & Japanese Pension Troubles
The idea to create a place-based visa system does not exist without the conception that
there is a problem to be solved. So, what problems do proponents of the policy believe a
place-based visa can solve? The first of a handful of problems is stagnant population
growth and population loss. Professor Charles Jones, in a working paper titled “The End
of Economic Growth? Unintended Consequences of a Declining Population,” (2020) lays
bare the deleterious effects of population decline. Jones begins by pointing out that a
number of economic models which study and project endogenous growth trends assume a
constant or increasing population. The issue with this crucial assumption is that it does
not always hold true. In the case of higher-income countries like Japan, Germany, Italy,
and Spain, the natural growth rate—the population growth rate without considering
immigration—has gone negative. When ignoring immigration, the fertility rate—or the
number of children born alive to women as a proportion of the average annual population
of women—in a country with a constant population size must be slightly above 2.0. This
helps the country’s population account for the rate at which people die before they reach
a certain age and maintain a stable population size. In high-income countries like the
U.S., the fertility rate as of 2018 has gotten as low as 1.73. If the fertility rate continues to
stay below 2.0, the U.S. will face a population decline crisis—barring immigration, of
course.
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Nevertheless, population decline undermines economic growth in a few ways.
Charles calls the overall effect of stagnant population size the “Empty Planet result,” and
shows that both endogenous and semi-endogenous growth models which fail to satisfy
the assumption of a constant population size can lead to the Empty Planet result. The
result is simply that “Economic growth stagnates as the stock of knowledge and living
standards settle down to constant values. Meanwhile, the population itself falls at a
constant rate, gradually emptying the planet of people.” This, in turn, depresses per capita
GDP and the economic dynamism which arises from having a younger, prime-workingage population. This will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis.
The immediate decrease in net population growth, however, can yield further
economic issues down the line. Japan exemplifies the trouble of a declining population
well. It is also one of the aforementioned high-income countries. As a high-income
country, Japan has a robust social security and pension system—while also having a
fertility rate of 1.42 and one of the oldest populations in the world. Noriyuki Takayama,
in his chapter “Pension Issues in Japan: How Can We Cope with the Declining
Population?” for the book, The Economic Consequences of Demographic Change in East
Asia, (2010) uses a balance sheet approach to analyze how demographic factors in Japan
affect the economic reality facing the country. The effect of having both an older
population and a lower fertility rate is an increase in the total cost of the pension system
and a gradual decrease in the revenue generated from all workers. While workers grow
older, the costs for pension increase, while the decrease in fertility means fewer workers
over time to generate revenue. When this book was published in 2010, it was expected
that the effect of the aging population alone would increase the cost of pension from 17.5
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percent of Japanese GDP in 2006 to 19.0 percent of Japanese GDP by 2025. The secondorder and third-order effects which follow result from the attempts to reform the pension
system to lower the redistributions to elderly Japanese. These attempted reforms likely
signaled to present and future pensioners that the government was not committed to the
pension system. Pension reform strife was associated with a later increase in nonparticipation in the pension system by various workers.

The EIG’s Heartland Visa Report: Local Government Revenues Falter
The EIG also makes population loss the central focus of why place-based visas should be
implemented. They use demographic data from the U.S. to show that while the share of
the population that is 65 years or older increases, the size of the prime working age
population remains low across the U.S. while decreasing in certain heartland states and
counties. The report estimates that by 2037, two-thirds of U.S. counties will contain
fewer prime working age adults than they did in 1997.
The example from Japan highlights the first of three economic strains posed by
population decline outlined by the EIG’s heartland visa report. The first economic strain
is on government budgets, particularly regarding retirement, pensions, and social
security. These demographic effects hit local governments especially hard, where
property taxes, sales taxes, and income taxes all suffer because of population decline.
There are some who might look at this explanation that local government finances suffer
because of population decline and respond that revenue decreases are acceptable because
as population declines, so do costs of local governance. However, as the EIG argues in
most if not all cases, population decline results in a greater loss of revenue for local
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governments than it results in a decrease of costs. An intuitive explanation of why this
might be is that government administration of public goods like roads or sanitation
systems may be modeled as an economy of scale. Holding factors like government
administration, political polarization, and the kinds of governmental services equal, very
large or very small constituent populations may not yield as much net revenue as a
constituent size within a certain medium zone. A related explanation for this is that public
goods may carry substantial fixed costs that are not liable to change simply because the
population decreased.
Another reason for why the lower cost explanation falls short is that the kind of
demographic loss matters. Because many rural and suburban counties are getting older
while losing their prime working age population, those residents who yield the most
benefit from government are the ones who stay, while the ones who on net contribute to
local government finances are the ones who leave. In other words, even if the cost to a
government is proportional to the size of the overall population, the revenue is
proportional to the size of working population. If the community is emptying out and
getting older, they are likely to be losing working-age revenue contributors more quickly
than their costs decrease.

The EIG’s Heartland Visa Report: Housing Markets Decline
The next notable reason why the EIG is concerned about population decline is its effect
on the local housing markets. The EIG first explains how population is intimately linked
with housing prices: the more people you have, the more demand you have for housing in
the local area. This increased, unmet demand can raise prices—unless supply is increased
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to meet demand. To increase supply, developers and local housing market stakeholders
would need to provide more housing by building and developing more housing units, or
by repurposing real estate used for lower capacity housing to real estate used for higher
capacity housing. This may require local governments to change zoning laws. Absent a
strong anti-density lobby or voting sentiment, increased demand can be met by increased
supply just by building more housing.
Population decline is more difficult to handle, though. Whereas population growth
can be met by building more housing, population decline is less likely to be met by a
decrease in supply. That would almost certainly require that local real estate be destroyed
rather than built. Demolishing local real estate can be complicated by a myriad of
political, economic, and legislative factors. The question of who will pay for demolition
is both relevant and complicated. In 2012, for instance, an article titled “When the best
way to save a neighborhood is to tear it down,” noted that amid the effects of the
foreclosure crisis that followed the housing bubble of 2008, “Federal programs such as
the Neighborhood Stabilization Program and the Obama administration’s proposed
Project Rebuild [didn’t] allow federal housing funds to be used mainly for demolition.”
With that said, some might look at local housing market prices decreasing as
positive thing, at least in some respects. This may especially be the case for renters, even
though it would clearly be a bad thing for landlords or homeowners who see their
properties as stable investments. The EIG notes that some might tallying up the costs or
benefits to numerous stakeholders an conclude that it is a wash—there are some gains
and some losses, but they should even out. The EIG presents four concrete reasons why
decreased housing prices can still pose a threat to local communities. The issues to which
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lower housing prices contribute include negative wealth effects, low construction activity,
vacant housing, and strained local government finances.
The first issue of low housing prices is that house equity is the most immediate
source of wealth for most U.S. citizens. If housing prices suffer, and the value of a
family’s home decreases, that hurts their ability to build wealth to pass down to their
children. Hence, lower housing prices can mean that wealth-building and social mobility
are inaccessible to areas experiencing population decline. The second issue of low prices
is that these low prices can result in lower construction activity. If the price of houses or
real estate is low, then there are few incentives to invest in that real estate by buying up
or building more properties or renovating older properties. This directly hurts the
construction industry in areas experiencing population decline. Granted, unless
construction presents society with a positive externality, there are some questions about
whether they should be subsidized.
In any case, the EIG’s third issue is called the “vacancy effect.” Most intuitively,
population decline can simply mean fewer people are living in that area, resulting in
vacant properties. Vacant properties can lead to a decay of the local real estate—beyond
lower prices, real estate will show physical signs of decline, such as decrepit, unkempt
properties, and trash. These signs of decline pose as physical hazards in the
neighborhood. Vacancies can also lead to a rise in crime rates in that area, further
decreasing the property values of even occupied homes. Lastly, as we said before, local
government revenue streams suffer. Before, we attributed revenue shortfalls to having
fewer people to pay taxes, but it is also worth noting that lower housing prices, increased
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vacancy rates, and decreased household wealth can all deal a huge blow to the finances of
local budgets as wealth and property taxes also experience shortfalls.

The EIG’s Heartland Visa Report: Reducing Dynamism
Finally, the EIG points out that population decline can hurt what they call “dynamism.”
Dynamism is a concept used to describe economic activity and it can be used when
talking about productivity and employment. Effectively, if an area or region has a higher
level of dynamism, or is more dynamic, then the area can also be said to exhibit higher
levels of productivity, economic activity, economic growth, and/or overall employment.
The EIG argues that the compounding pressures of population decline and the aging of
local populations are leading to a decline in several dimensions important to dynamism.
The first dimension is that of innovation. When a local population experiences
population growth, they are also more likely to experience the moving in of businesses
and franchises or investment from those who try to start new businesses. The EIG writes
“A 1 percentage point increase in average annual population growth is associated with a 1
percentage point increase in the startup rate, all else equal,” with the association likely
being causal. The report cites the work of past studies that has demonstrated “that growth
in local population and, in particular, the prime working age population, drives startup
rates.” Startups, or new businesses matter to innovation and dynamism because new
businesses can employ the local population, generate tax revenue, and attract consumers
and others to the local region. When population decline is taking place, new businesses
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are less likely to start or move into an area, likely because they do not see any business
opportunities to do so.
The second dimension is that of productivity. An important factor of productivity
in an economy is the age of the workers. The younger the workers in an economy, the
more productive it is likely to be. This initially runs counter to the economic
understanding of human capital returns made by training and work experience which is
accumulated over time. On the one hand, older workers who have more experience are
likely to be paid more because they have more expertise, training, and industry
knowledge. This allows them to work more efficiently than younger, less-experienced
coworkers. However, the EIG cites research which shows that a critical mass of older
workers in a workplace can dampen productivity. This association between an older
workforce and lower productivity is robust when accounting for state, industry, and firm
fixed effects.
The EIG notes that more research is needed to try to explain this association, but
the working hypothesis at the time is that the older a worker, the less efficient it is to train
them with new technologies. This can be because the uptake with the technology may be
lower for older workers and because older workers will make use of the training for less
time because they will retire sooner, meaning that employers will have less time to
recoup the costs of training their older workers. Younger workers, on the other hand are
perceived to be more robust, more innovative, and more active. What they lack in
experience, they might make up for in their energy, technological aptitude, and fresh
ideas. An analysis by Moody’s Analytics finds that a 1 percentage point increase in the
share of the workforce age 65 and up reduces productivity by between 1 and 3 percentage
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points. Some economists use this finding to explain between one-quarter and threequarters of the productivity slowdown over the past decade or so.
The third and final dimension of dynamism is that of human capital. Many of
these areas are experiencing population decline because the residents of those areas are
likely to be less educated than those residents of areas experiencing population growth.
This means that elements of human capital like training, professional development,
professional work experience, or technological aptitude are likely to be missing from
those areas with lower rates of education. This human capital gap can be found in the
innovation disparity between low and high growth areas, measured by the rate at which
members of different geographic areas obtain patents. The fastest-growing counties in the
U.S. obtain 3.4 patents per 1,000 people, while the fastest-shrinking counties in the U.S.
obtain 1.1 patents per 1,000 people. This lack of innovation, as we said before, can
further contribute to the dilemma of low levels of employment opportunities. Without
innovation, investment, and the creation of new businesses, it is hard to attract and
maintain workers because those workers will not see economic opportunities for
themselves in the area, though high-skilled workers are more likely to relocate. If there is
no innovation, high-skilled workers will find no reason to live in the area, which makes it
hard to sustain a service economy which might employ low-skilled workers.

Immigrant Visas Resource-Allocation Problems
This final problem is more political than it is economic or developmental, but it will be
crucial to understand so we can discuss the political possibility of passing a PBI reform.
The present immigration system is centralized within the federal government. The
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authority to determine who can enter or live in the country and become a permanent
resident in the country is controlled almost entirely either by the executive branch and the
president and their cabinet or by the legislative branch and the many members of
Congress capable of voting on immigration legislation. Congress derives its power to
determine such matters from the Constitution, as it is the sole legislative authority of the
federal government. The President and their cabinet, on the other hand, does not have any
natural authority in the matter. It is only with the statutory and financial consent of
Congress via bills dictating the structure of the executive agencies and spending bills that
the President and their cabinet can act on matters of immigration. Hence, while Congress
has the power to issue new visa quota guidelines and institute new programs, and grant
new powers to the Executive Branch, the Executive—the President and their cabinet—
oversees implementing and exercising those powers in accordance with Congressional
legislation. Because it is impossible for Congress to delineate the Executive's authority
and legal course of action in exactly every situation, the Executive has some discretion in
using the powers granted to them by Congress.
So where does this leave state governments on the question of authority over the
immigration process? Under the current framework, states are afforded no power over
immigration. They cannot decide who or which immigrants to admit, or whether the
immigrants spend more or less time in their states or local communities, primarily
because they have no control over the visas. This suggests that the federal process may
fail is not legislating effectively with respect to local preferences. This is due to the
nature of the federal legislative process and the politics of immigration reform, which
produces a nearly one-size-fits-all policy after accumulating input from over 400 state-
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and county-level elected officials. This imprecise legislation does not allow state and
local communities to self-determine the allocation of visas that would work for them.
Ultimately, this means that the government’s action on visa policy is creating an
allocation problem.

B. How would Place-Based Visas Help?
The Economic and Political Case for Decentralization
The case for decentralizing the immigration process is based on the last problem we
discussed, the inefficient allocation of visas. The current structure and institutions
dedicated to crafting and enforcing immigration policy in the U.S. do not leave room for
state and local governments to tailor immigration policies to their local-level
circumstances. This means that state and local governments, if they had some preference
for which immigrants or how many immigrants they wanted to bring into their
jurisdictions, could not act on that preference. In this way, the current immigration
system is experiencing an allocation problem that does not direct visas to be used in the
ways that would be most beneficial.
Allocation problems, particularly those which result from preference-aggregation
problems, have economic solutions. Assume, for instance that a manager runs a
manufacturing firm and needs to distribute 100 units or raw material A and 100 units of
raw material B to 100 workers, 50 of whom specialize in working with A and 50 of
whom specialize in working with B. If each worker can efficiently produce using their
respective, specialized resources, then the most efficient distribution will send two units
of A to each of the first 50 workers who specialize in working with A, and two units of B

M o s l i m a n i | 37

to each of the 50 workers who specialize in working with B. Assume that each worker,
because the manager does not know each worker’s specialization, received one unit of A
and one unit of B. This outcome would be less efficient that the first because workers will
have to work with materials outside of their specialization. Now assume, because the
manager underestimates the number of workers available to her, that four units of A are
distributed to just 25 workers each who specialize in A while four units of B are
distributed to just 25 workers each who specialize in B. This also will not be efficient
because not all the workers are engaged in the production process, and some are doing
relatively more work than their peers. These are simply two examples of what might be
called a top-down preference-aggregation problem that results in an allocation problem.
What is the solution to this allocation problem? In the previous circumstances, the
manager was in charge of determining who received what resources. It was possible to
conceive of a situation in which the manager allocated the resources efficiently such that
the most utility was derived from the productive process as possible. However, it was
also possible to see that a single manager could operate on faulty information and run
into a preference-aggregation problem whereby they misallocate resources because their
knowledge about preferences and other productive factors was incomplete. Ultimately,
preference-aggregation problems are solved by creating a mechanism to communicate
ground-level information to the level of administrators and policy makers. In the case of
immigration policy on the state and local level, however, aggregating information does
not seem to be the problem. As we said before, there are more than 400 state- and locallevel elected officials who are meant to represent the interests of state and local
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constituents. The fact that these roles exist is evidence that the government is at least in
some ways aggregating the preferences of state and local constituencies.
So, if the allocation problem is not resulting from preference-aggregation issues,
then how might we explain the fact that there are some state and local governments
whose preferences for immigration are not being met? Simply, the issue lies in the stateand local-level flexibility of the legislation produced, and the ability of state and local
governments to have a say in its implementation. The source of this allocation problem,
then, is not the inability of the federal government to aggregate preferences, but the
inflexibility and on-size-fits-all nature of the federal policies created in response to those
preferences which does not allow for local-level tailoring. This is the heart of the
allocation problem—state and local governments have no say in the allocation of visas.
The solution to this issue in the economic and political sense is decentralization.
The idea that decentralized systems in which individuals are given a stake in making
distributive and allocative decisions is better than systems where allocation systems
handled by a single manager is the impetus behind the doctrine of federalism. In a
federalist system, a country is governed jointly by a general, overarching national
government in conjunction with numerous, exclusive regional or state governments. In
the U.S., the federal government exists as a separate entity from the many state, tribal,
and territorial governments which make up the U.S. and its territories. The Constitutional
Founders sought to create this system to unite the original thirteen states under a central
authority, currency, and territorial identification while allowing regional state authorities
to govern themselves according to their own interests. The intuition behind this approach
was that a single national government would not be able to govern all thirteen states as
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easily as those states would be able to govern themselves. Hence, one theory of
governance dictates that policy should be pushed to the lowest levels of governance
possible—the exception to this is when pushing a policy debate down to a lower level of
governance will generate undesirable externalities for jurisdictions outside of the lower
government’s jurisdiction. If two cities each border a lake and have partial jurisdiction
over that lake, then the two cities must agree about certain policies, such as the policies
pertaining to dumping into and upkeep of the lake. If there are discrepancies, then at least
one locality will be wasting its resources.
Under the current system of government, legislation, statute, and regulations
around citizenship and immigration are controlled nearly entirely by the federal
government. As we said previously, the current system does not allow state and local
governments to determine for themselves who will be brought into their local
communities or for what purposes. A PBI reform would decentralize the immigration
process by giving states and local communities the power to sponsor immigrants in
accordance with their own economic, social, and political preferences. This idea
conforms with the economists’ proclivity for decentralized allocation decisions as well as
the doctrine of federalism which inspired the country’s democratic republican system of
governance. The next question worth asking is how local-level immigrant placement
decisions affect social, economic, political, or cultural outcomes for jurisdictions outside
of the original jurisdictions. Put another way, how does City A’s policies affect social,
economic, political, or cultural outcomes for neighboring City B.

Examples of State and Local Policies
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There are hundreds, if not thousands, of examples of state and local governments writing
policies which are designed and tailored to local-level circumstances. One such example
is that of localized minimum wage laws. The purpose behind a minimum wage law is to
set a standard for how much workers in a certain jurisdiction will be paid. Guaranteeing a
minimum wage to workers affects not only workers—such laws also affect low-wage
employers, families or dependents of low-wage employees, producers and retailers who
sell goods and services to low-wage employees, and a myriad of other stakeholders.
Because the political and economic reasons for raising a minimum wage vary widely
from region to region or locale to locale, the minimum wage itself can also vary widely.
In one city, the minimum wage set by the federal or even state government may do little
to assist citizens in meeting their minimum cost of living. In another city, raising the
minimum wage above the federal or state level might put undue pressure on small
business owners who might already be struggling to meet labor costs. For this reason, the
minimum wage is one such example of a policy that can be tailored in a place-based way.
The benefits of treating minimum wage and other compensation policies on a
place-based rather than one-size-fits-all basis is theoretically clear: to meet the economic
and political needs of local areas, local governments need to tailor compensation policies
according to local circumstances. If the cost of living is increasing but wages remain
substandard, then, holding all other factors constant, the minimum wage should also
increase. The one concern for a local-level change, however, is that it might affect
outcomes in, or its intended effects might be dampened by the existence of a contiguous
city. Citizens who live at the border of two cities might simply choose to work in the city
with the higher minimum wage. This can increase labor supply in the city with the higher
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minimum wage and tighten the labor market. Hence local-level policies, though they are
tailored to the circumstances for those living in certain communities, need to be wary of
spillover effects that result from a discrepancy in policies between contiguous
communities.
Professors Arindrajit Dube and Attila Lindner, in “City Limits: What Do LocalArea Minimum Wages Do?” (2021) studied the increasingly frequent localization of
minimum wage policies. The impetus behind this study was the increased likelihood that
cities in the U.S. impose their own minimum wage laws—in 2010, they found only three
cities who minimum wages exceeded those set by the federal or state government
standards. In 2020, they found 42. Although they recognized that the increasing
localization of minimum wage policies had to be balanced with the trade-offs to
aforementioned stakeholders besides minimum wage employees, they found that, overall,
place-based, “city-level minimum wages seem to be able to tailor the policy to local
economic environment without imposing substantial distortions in allocation of labor and
businesses across locations.” Showing that local policies could be crafted with no
significant distortions to neighboring or semi-contiguous local labor markets speaks to
the power of some forms of localized policymaking to enact change without the need for
input from neighboring local communities. Regarding a place-based visa system, this
shows that state and local governments can truly tailor their policies to their own
constituency’s needs with relative sovereignty.
Localized—or place-based—minimum wage policies are just one example of how
policy at the local level can differ from that of federal level. The successful localization
of minimum wage policies lends credence to the idea that local communities may want to
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take some level of control over the immigration process to use visas to meet local needs
and preferences rather than rely on the federal immigration system alone.

The Economic and Political Benefits of Place-Based Visas
Beyond giving state and local governments power over the allocation of visas, there is a
case that place-based visas can also combat the detrimental effects of population decline.
We once again turn to the EIG’s heartland visas report.
It is important to note first that policymakers must also consider longer-term
interventions to combat the looming threat of population decline, and not just in heartland
areas of the U.S. Families and couples across the country worry every day about the costs
associated with raising children, chief among them being childcare costs. Because of such
costs, some families with productive, high-earning guardians put off having children
because of the disruption this would pose to their career tracks. To address concerns over
low fertility rates and subsequent population decline across the U.S., policy makers will
likely need to look at long-term social policies which can make it worth it for people to
have children again.
Nevertheless, the EIG believes that at least in the medium term, place-based visas
can offer a meaningful path to addressing population decline. The immediate logic
proceeds as follows: if population decline is causing so many problems for areas all over
the country, then bolstering local populations with immigrants should stem the resulting
issues of population decline. The EIG study explores exactly how immigration can
combat the specific effects of population decline. The report draws on economic
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literature to discuss how local immigration can bolster housing markets, improve local
government finances, rekindle dynamism, and strengthen local labor markets.
The EIG cites economist Albert Saiz, who finds in a 2007 study that a 1 percent
increase in the immigrant population in a local community is associated with a 1 percent
increase in the housing rents and housing prices in that community. Though this may
mean that immigration can put stress on cities or areas experiencing tight housing
markets—metropolitan cities like New York City or San Francisco might come to
mind—this increase in housing market prices can keep communities afloat in areas of the
country experiencing population decline. As has been discussed before, bolstering
housing prices not only aids families hoping to use real estate as a means for social
mobility and wealth-building, but it also improves local government finances.
Falling housing prices undermine local government finances because taxes on
property, wealth, or real estate transactions may be integral to local government finances.
Immigration can help reverse these trends. However, bringing immigrants into a state or
local community also directly affects local government finances by bringing in taxpayers.
Immigrants, especially if they are the kind of high-skilled or working immigrants which
state or local governments might like to prioritize if given the opportunity to offer visas
to their states, are taxpayers in multiple forms. The Center for American Program (CAP)
found that immigrants with active DACA status contributed as much as “$5.7 billion in
federal taxes and $3.1 billion in state and local taxes annually… [and boosted] Social
Security and Medicare through Payroll taxes.” DACA recipients also tout “a combined
$24.1 billion in spending power… each year.” Any state or local government which
implements a sales tax continues to generate tax revenue from immigrants even after the
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immigrants’ income is taxed. The EIG also cites what they call the National Academy of
Sciences’ “most comprehensive analysis of the effects of skilled immigrants on state and
local fiscal conditions,” which found that “every skilled immigrant with a bachelor’s
degree adds a net of $105,000 to the fiscal balance of state and local governments over a
75-year period. Immigrants with a graduate degree add $200,002.”
In addition to aiding the public sector in generating revenue for local
governments, immigrants can assist the private sector by rekindling dynamism.
Increasing immigration to declining areas is likely to increase dynamism because it
reverses or addresses many of the problems which result from population decline. The
ideal forms of immigration proposed by the EIG can directly increase population growth,
slow the aging of the population, and increase average human capital. More than that,
immigrants to the U.S., particularly skilled immigrants who might benefit from placebased visas, are more entrepreneurial than native-born citizens. The EIG writes that
“Immigrants represent 18% of global patent-filers in the United States, are inventors or
co-inventors of about 25% of all technologies developed in the United States, and
account for 33% of all U.S. Nobel Prizes.” The Pew Research Center, in an article titled
“Key findings about U.S. immigrants,” finds that the share of the U.S. population in 2018
was 13.7 percent. The all-time high for the share of the population that is foreign-born
was in 1890, at 14.8 percent. Given these two statistics, and data between 1940 and 1990
which puts the share at less than 10 percent, immigrants are over-represented in their
contributions to the forms of innovation discussed above. This lends credence to the idea
that immigrants can play an outsize role in starting new businesses, attracting consumers,
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and innovating or inventing new products and service in areas experiencing population
decline.
These contributions to dynamism also mean a strengthening of the local labor
market. This may seem counterintuitive at first when looking at immigration from a
simple labor supply and labor demand standpoint. An influx of working-age immigrants
can increase labor supply, which many argue will necessarily increase labor competition
and depresses wage growth for local, native-born workers. An often-overlooked caveat to
this logic is that immigrants may also increase labor demand—by immigrating to a local
economy, they can drive up demand for local goods and services. This increased demand
in the local economy increases the labor demand from those firms and businesses that try
to meet the new economic demand.
The simple supply and demand perspective of immigrant labor also assumes that
immigrants are looking for jobs in industries with tight labor markets or which are
already occupied by native workers. Often, restrictionists will forget that immigrants can
look for high-skilled jobs, jobs in industries facing labor shortages or which do not
normally employ natives, or even start their own businesses. When high-skilled
immigrants come to the U.S., they might be doing so because they have secured a job in
an industry that was already facing labor shortages and was having trouble finding
qualified native applicants. Additionally, when immigrants start their own businesses,
they not only avoid competing with native born workers—they may also draw consumers
to the local economy and hire local workers. This puts upward pressure on labor demand
while avoiding an increase in labor supply.
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This logic about the local economic gains made through immigration are
supported by analysis and insights from the Cato Institute and Alex Nowrasteh, Cato’s
Director of Immigration Studies. In the fall of 2019, Nowrasteh spoke on a panel hosted
by the House of Representatives’ Problem Solvers Caucus to discuss an immigration
reform proposal put forth by the research-advocacy group, the New American Economy.
During the panel, Nowrasteh detailed his reasons for disagreeing with the economic
grievances often raised when talking about immigrants and immigration. He directly
opposed the findings of anti-low-wage-immigrant economists like George Borjas to argue
that the labor effects of immigration are not unambiguously negative, arguing using much
of the same logic included above.
In a Cato journal entry titled “Does Immigration Reduce Wages?” Alan de
Brauw, now a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute,
also critiques Borjas’s work and discussed what he thought were shortcomings which,
when addressed, undermine the magnitude of Borjas’s findings of the negative effects of
immigration on labor outcomes for native-born workers. De Brauw ultimately concludes
that for all the hotly debated research on the effect of immigration on native-born labor
outcomes, the most stable research findings indicate that the effect of immigration on the
wages of native-born workers is “either very small or zero.” When considering that placebased visas could be used exclusively to draw a higher proportion of high-skilled,
entrepreneurial immigrants than the current immigration process, it would certainly be
possible that such immigration would bolster the local labor market. Of course, this
depends on how state and local governments distribute visas.
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This brings us to the final and primary point which should be used to emphasize
the benefits of a place-based visa system on the local labor market and generally: placebased visas are exactly that. They are place-based. They are not national, and they are not
one-size-fits-all. Because they are place-based, state and local governments will have the
power to determine what kinds of immigrants their local communities need. If a local
community is facing a shortage of entrepreneurs, the local government can sponsor
prospective business owners or immigrants who can prove their ability to invest in the
local community. If the local community is facing a tight labor market for childcare
workers, then the government can sponsor visas for those who would work in the U.S. as
childcare workers. This would allow state and local governments to also avoid bringing
in immigrants who would increase labor supply in industries facing already-substantial
labor surpluses.
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VI.
What are the Potential Costs of PBI?
A. What are the Concerns over Place-Based Visas?
Place-based visas, and place-based immigration reform in general, are not the central
focus of the immigration debate today. The consequence of this is that though some
political institutions like think-tanks, advocacy groups, and research organizations may
have generated numerous studies supporting this proposal, the idea to create place-based
visas does not yet have the level of attention it need to garner a critical mass of policyspecific concerns. That is to say that there are not enough stakeholders paying attention to
place-based visa proposals to gather the attention of potential critics. This also says
nothing about the fact that immigration reform itself is such a gargantuan, loaded topic
with a number of preceding issues that it would not immediately make sense for placebased visas to come up in the debate when there are more pressing and entrenched
political concerns that pre-date this proposal. Finally, the current political divisions over
immigration—evidenced by the lack of consequential, bipartisan immigration reform in
the past 30 years—make it hard for even bipartisan measures to pass while partisan
proposals poison and muddy the policy process.
None of that is to say, however, that economic, social, or political concerns over
place-based visas do not exist in more general forms. Place-based policy proposals can
generate concerns over its ideas to target the economic effects of the policy by place and
to increase immigration in general. These two ideas individually have a fair share of
criticism aimed at them, so it would be helpful to see how much of that criticism is
warranted when applying it to the proposal to create place-based visas.
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B. The Potential Economic Distortions of Place-Based Policies and Immigration
Place-Based Distortions of Market Forces
We will begin by reviewing the logic and criticism of place-based economic policies. It is
necessary to clarify our previous discussion of localized policies like localized minimum
wages to say that, for the purposes of further discussion, the term “place-based policies”
will not be used to describe localized policies. Instead, “place-based policies” will be
used to describe, economic, social, or political policies meant to address a specific case of
economic or social decline.
The primary reason for designing and instituting place-based social or economic
policies is to counter some crisis in a state or local community. One such case would be a
policy that institutes opportunity zones or place-based enterprise policies. These policies
are designed to incentivize private citizens and businesses to invest in local communities
by moving there, spending money there, or starting a business there, among other things.
These policies have their own fair share of criticism—one critique raised against
such place-based policies is that trying to incentivize and instigate economic prosperity in
declining locales is that such efforts are inefficient. Some economists, for instances,
question why those locales deserve economic support to attract people, businesses, and
activity without first asking why those places are declining in dynamism first. David
Kraybill, in describing this discontent with such policies, writes that “economists in the
mainstream of the economics discipline have long viewed place-oriented development
policies as a form of protectionism promoted by local, landed interests who wished to
resist inevitable change. Rather, mainstream economists have generally had a preference
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for people-oriented policies, viewed as both efficient and redistributive.” Effectively,
economists are concerned that place-based policies fail to serve the people in those
places, and ultimately function as subsidies for inefficient or outdated socioeconomic
arrangements that attract and ultimately trap low-income workers.
However, recent studies seem to indicate that place-based economic policies may
not be as deleterious as theoretical economic models have generally indicated. For
instance, Kraybill argued that the place-based policies can be effective when they are less
costly than people-based alternatives. One such example Kraybill gave is “a place-based
policy of providing lump-sum grants to small-town entrepreneurs to help them retool or
upgrade to become competitive and successful in the market economy, and to help their
town grow to achieve the critical mass of population to sustain itself.” It was thought that
this policy might be more fiscally feasible and thus more effective than a people-based
policy which would require that local governments pay large sums of money out to
individuals hit hardest by the local decline. Unfortunately, people-based policies which
increase expenditure while experiencing population decline are likely to exacerbate the
issue of strained local government finances.
This brings us to “Jobs for the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st Century
America,” (2018) a study by Professors Benjamin A. Austin, Edward L. Glaeser,
Lawrence H. Summers. This study adds empirical evidence to the idea that place-based
economic changes can effectively combat decline. It finds that in areas where labor
participation has been low or decreasing, increases in labor demand appear to have a
disproportionately beneficial effect on employment relative to areas that do not
experience such high rate of labor non-participation. To the authors, this suggests that
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using policies which would subsidize employment, such as enhancing the Earned Income
Tax Credit based on place, could theoretically improve economic outcomes for those in
areas experiencing decline. This credit is offered to low- and moderate-income working
individuals and couples. Increasing the credit specifically in areas of low labor
participation would act as an employment subsidy to incentivize workers to participate in
the labor market. In this way, the benefit of the place-based policy goes directly to low
and middle-income workers with ripple effects for the broader community given a greater
worker purchasing power. This would allow for a place-based enterprise policy that
avoids creating inefficient socioeconomic arrangements which benefit local property
owners.
The effect of a PBI policy on market forces, however, is still not made clear
through this discussion. A PBI policy would not provide the kind of subsidy to local
native workers that an EITC—rather, it would likely work to increase the total economic
pie in the local area. At the same time, it might subsidize local economic institutions and
generate rents for property owners. If an immigrant is granted a place-based employment
visa, they will live, work, and pay taxes almost solely in that area. Though this means
higher rents to local owners of capital, it cans still boost local government finances.
Besides creating employment opportunities for natives and bolstering local economic
activity, place-based immigrants may be able to support the local native population
through their contributions to local government finances. These contributions can then be
used to distribute an employment subsidy to citizens.

Immigration Distortions of Native Location Choice
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There are numerous ways that immigration could also change various economic
outcomes or distributions. To start, it is hard to imagine that immigration does not change
anything about how economic activity is distributed; for a casual empiricist to argue that,
they would need to assume not only that immigrants would mimic all the same economic
behaviors as the native population in which they are settling, but also that the native
population does not change their economic behavior in response to presence of these new
immigrants.
And there are several ways we could imagine these assumptions falling apart—
immigrants might be slow on the uptake of local spending habits, particularly in the
realm of food. Immigrants might want to buy different produce to make ethnic meals or
spend on food in different restaurants than the local population. They might have
different cyclical spending habits when it comes to celebrating holidays and giving gifts
to those around them. If the local immigrant population for any one group reaches a
critical mass, the group might start to look like an ethnic enclave with ethnically and
culturally relevant businesses, social norms, and community events.
And what would the native community think about this development? Though it
is hard to assume what any one community’s response would be—and because it might
even depend on how “compatible” the native community believes the immigrants are
with them and their society—it is hard to assume that local behavior would not change in
response to immigration. Even the simple fact that new businesses which had not
previously existed would either add onto or replace the previous businesses which has
existed in that ecosystem suggests that natives will end up changing their economic
habits in some form or another.
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In “Immigration and the Neighborhood,” (2011) economists Albert Saiz and
Susan Wachter attempt to prove this by studying the effects of local immigration, local
immigrant density, and localized settling patterns (segregation or self-segregation) for
immigrants on native flight and housing value appreciation. In a model where the
economists assumed perfect migratory mobility, they found that housing values grew
more slowly in neighborhoods with increasing immigrant density relative to
neighborhoods where the density of immigrants grew more slowly. Furthermore, the
authors specify that the results which indicate a negative association between
immigration and local housing prices seem driven more by the low socioeconomic and
minority group status of the immigrants than by immigrant foreignness specifically. This
conforms with the intuition that it is perceived socioeconomic and cultural differences
with immigrants that leads to frictions with the native population and changes to native
economic behavior. At the same time, the authors find evidence of a tendency of
immigrants to self-segregate with other immigrants, leading to the creation of lowincome ethnic enclaves. The authors believe that those natives who live at the margins of
these enclaves are more likely to take flight from the community than those who live
farther from the enclave.
George Borjas, in “Native Internal Migration and the Labor Market Impact
of Immigration,” (2006) also studied inter-local migration and similarly found that
greater local immigration is associated with lower in-migration rates as well as greater
out-migration rates. We can understand this through the lens of native response to the
growing prominence of ethnic enclaves and the lens of local real estate price. While
difference with immigrants might be one qualitative reason for which native take flight,

M o s l i m a n i | 54

the economics immigration-induced local population growth also suggest that natives
would want to move because of saturated labor markets. This can cause natives both to
move away and decide not to move there to begin with.
This literature does not clarify how PBI would affect local native choice,
however. The Saiz-Wachter study does not fully illuminate this question because it
associates immigration with slower relative growth in the prices of the local housing
market—meaning that many of the subjects in its study are growing anyway. Placebased visas, however, are not seen as a policy proposal meant to target areas with housing
growth but are instead meant to target areas which are facing housing decline.
Furthermore, this study assumes perfect migratory capability of the local population.
This, however, is not a fair assumption for those same areas which are experiencing
economic decline—not everyone who might want to move out in response to new
immigrants will be able to, likely because the resources of those who are stuck in those
areas are constrained. Otherwise, what reasons did they not have to move out already?
Finally, the study establishes these results while it also establishes that there is a tendency
of new immigrants to self-segregate, a practice which likely contributes to the negative
native response to the creation of low-income, ethnic enclaves. If state and local
governments wish, they can try to address the self-segregation concern and resulting
socioeconomic responses by choosing where the immigrants are settled. Some level of
local government involvement in the settlement process of place-based visa recipients
will likely take place anyway, at least as far as coordination is concerned.
Additionally, Borjas’s 2006 study does not help us understand what effect a
place-based visa would have since his finding that immigration tends to increase out-
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migration and decrease in-migration does not clarify what employment-based
immigration would do for those areas already experiencing population decline. If placebased immigrants can revitalize local economies, then that might encourage in-migration.
The reason for this possible difference is that Borjas’s study focuses on immigrants
broadly, while place-based immigrants will inherently be targeted and specific to the
preferences of the state and local government. Place-based visas still show promise in
their ability to combat decreasing real estate prices because they address population
decline.

Immigration Distortions of the Local Labor Market
In trying to understand how place-based visas might rekindle dynamism is declining
areas, we already reviewed some of the potential benefits to local labor markets. In doing
so, we also alluded to the broad literature regarding immigration’s effect on local and
inter-local labor outcomes for native workers and earlier immigrants. In the last
subsection in Chapter 4, we discussed what the generally accepted findings of
immigration’s effect on native wages looked like. We also looked at de Brauw’s revision
of Borjas’ findings on immigration’s effect on native wages, which have generally been
the most pessimistic. Whereas Borjas has typically found the immigration elasticity of
wage to be -.3 to -.4, adjusting his model brings his findings closer to the typical findings
the immigration elasticity of wage is -.2. This adjusted elasticity means that if the number
of immigrants were to increase by 10 percent, it would be expected that wages for nativeborn workers would decrease by 2 percent.
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Economists Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber, in “Task Specialization,
Immigration, and Wages,” (2009) conduct a broad view of the literature on immigrants’
effects on wages to find differences in how various models perform. Their paper
introduces a microsimulation methodology to test for inherent bias in regression models
and finds that Borjas’s model from 2006 displayed a strong bias for indicating that
simulated datasets exhibited local displacement of natives. The models of other
economists, namely that of David Card in his study “How Immigration Affects U.S.
Cities,” (2007) were more accurate and unbiased. Card’s study “Immigrant Inflows,
Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration” (2001)
finds that a 10 percent increase in the relative population share of a group is associated
with a .5 percent decrease in the employment rate of that group. Though this elasticity
does not discuss wages as Borjas’s and de Brauw’s work do, it does show that even a
substantial increase in a population generates relatively small economic impacts on that
population’s labor prospects.
Much of this research, however, focuses particularly on the depressive effects of
immigration when immigrants compete with natives in the labor market. As has been
discussed previously, this need not necessarily be a concern in the place-based visa policy
debates if local policymakers and stakeholders can work together to identify which and
how many immigrants are required to revitalize their local communities, fill local labor
gaps, and preserve wages for native workers in the area.

C. The Potential Socio-Political Distortions from Immigration
Immigration Distortions of Native Support for Public Policies
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If we believe that the presence of immigrants changes native economic choices, we can
also assume that it would also affect native political choices. In “Immigration and
Redistribution” (2018), Professors Alberto Alesina, Armando Miano, and Stefanie
Stantcheva conduct a cross-national survey to identify how, if at all, the perception of the
presence of immigrants affects native attitudes around certain public policies. The
surveys took place in 2017 and 2018, two years which followed a particularly tense time
for Western countries wrestling with new nativist and populist strains which arose in
response to the Middle Eastern refugee crises brought about by the Syrian Civil War.
They found, first, that survey respondents first greatly overestimated the presence of
culturally dissimilar and economically feeble immigrants. When the researchers followed
up with questions meant to gauge support for native welfare programs, respondents who
believed that there were more immigrants rated their support for public goods programs
as being lower. The researchers also found that even trying to provide facts meant to clear
misperceptions about the number or quality of immigrants did not substantially raise
support for public goods policies. The researchers believed that during a time of such
negative coverage of immigrants, simply making people think about immigrants—even
when trying to clear up misperceptions—still made individuals support public programs
less frequently than when they were not thinking about immigrants.
This negative effect of immigration on attitudes toward public goods is borne out
in other studies. In the study “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,” (1997) professors
Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly find that what they call “ethnic
fragmentation” is inversely related to shares of spending on productive public goods like
sanitation, roads, and education, even when controlling for other socioeconomic and
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demographic determinants. Their conclusion is that some form of ethnic conflict, which
we will call ethno-social tension, is an important determinant of spending on public
goods. Effectively, this study, in trying to explain why some multi-ethnic communities
faced lower relative expenditures on productive public goods, pointed to the resistance of
some ethnic groups to contribute to public goods which might be used by other ethnic
groups.
This literature builds off the intuition that natives might see immigrants as
competitors in the social, political, and economic sense—for that reason, natives would
want to resist allowing in those “competitors” or contributing to public goods that the
“competitors” could use. The paper “The Political Impact of Immigration: Evidence from
the United States” (2018) by Anna Maria Mayda, Giovanni Peri, and Walter Steingress
builds on this idea. They studied county-level data to understand how local immigration
affected the outcome of elections. Both the level and “quality” of immigration to local
areas was associated with variation in electoral outcomes. The study found that
immigration seemed to affect vote shares for candidates from the Republican party,
which is associated with a more restrictive immigration platform, though the kind of
immigration mattered. While high-skilled immigration was associated with a decrease in
the vote share for Republican candidates, a higher rate of lower-skilled immigration was
associated with an increase in the vote share for Republican candidates. Additionally, it
was found that the effect of lower-skilled immigration was more pronounced in nonurban, lower-income counties which would be more likely to see immigrants as
“competitors” in the local job market.
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As to how this factors into considerations about a potential place-based visa
policy proposal, the question for local policy makers is “how do we want to frame this
policy to our constituents?” In some ways, policymakers can pre-empt these concerns by
openly tailoring the program to bring in higher-skilled, more entrepreneurial immigrants
who can revitalize the local economy and avoid competing with native workers. Further,
they can frame the use of these visas as an attempt for their local constituency to take
control of the federal immigration process to make it work for them. Overall, the local
concerns which arise out of mass low-skilled immigration into local communities need
not be top of mind to policy makers because they can use their platforms to assure their
constituents of how this form of immigration may differ from other, more contentious
forms. Hence, the ability of this policy to survive backlash depends on the political
ecosystem and the framing from various stakeholders, from the local to the national level.

Immigration Distortions of Overall Political Activities
Like the previous section, if it is possible that the presence of immigrants would change
overall economic choice-making in local communities, then it should also be possible for
immigrants to affect the overall policy-making process. Beyond changing the political
choices of their native counterparts, they can, even before becoming eligible to vote, take
part in various political activities. First-generation immigrants are still able to organize
and affect policy through the simple fact of their economic capabilities. If the economic
system allows them property rights, they will naturally have some local stake in the
community in which they live, rent, buy property, and do business.
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As we said before, migratory patterns themselves may shift with relation to the
stock of immigrants in the local community. If we assume that natives and immigrants
differ in their political choices, then a change in the stock either by increased immigration
or decreased native presence will likely shift local political outcomes. Professor Allison
Shertzer explores this in her study, “Immigrant group size and political mobilization:
Evidence from European migration to the United States,” (2016). Her study explores the
effect of an immigrant group’s size and their ability and willingness to mobilize
politically. What she found is that as the size of immigrants in a local community
increases, so does their willingness and ability to mobilize on a political level. Among the
plethora of reasons why this might happen, two come to mind. The first reason is
endogenous to the ethnic group and uses Mancur Olson’s theory on “inclusive goods” in
collective action to argue that the gains made from political mobilization might be more
easily obtained if the ethnic group has more members to back any certain political
initiative. If the inclusive good is one that all members of the ethnic group would favor,
then having more members of that ethnic group in the constituency is better than having
fewer because having more members can lead to more votes on and higher mobilization
around an issue that is in their interest. The second reason is exogenous to the ethnic
groups and relates to the desire of political parties to pander to and capitalize on a
potentially sympathetic constituency. Professor Shertzer identifies the desire of the
Democratic party to mobilize ethnic groups in certain areas where they needed more
votes to win various elections as one example of this.
The relevance of this research to the place-based policy proposal really depends
on whether the use of place-based visas would contribute—either in the short or long-
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term—to the creation of large-enough ethnic groups such that the electoral calculus for
local elections would change. Because the place-based visas are designed to be
distributed on a skills basis to revitalize local economies and fill local labor market
shortages, it is not immediately clear how a local government’s preferences and visadistribution choices might lead to a sizeable constituency of any one ethnic group.
However, the presence of even a small ethnic group can, once that ethnic group becomes
more established in the U.S. and especially once enough members of that group start
receiving citizenship, family reunification visas can play a large part in speeding up the
diversification of a local community and the growth of any one ethnic group. At that
point, the implications of this research would be borne out. However, it is worth asking
whether that should be a worthy concern to local policy makers or constituents. With how
much certainty can stakeholders identify how local political calculus might change as
demographics change? Furthermore, are such concerns more pressing than possible
solutions to economic and demographic problems in the local community? Without a
clear answer to either of these questions, it is not immediately clear that this concern is
worth it for policymakers and constituents to mull over. Even though the second question
could be answered in some referendum, local policy makers would need serious fortunetelling capabilities to answer the first question.

D. Concerns for New Immigrants to Areas with Different Ethnic Identities
As we previously discussed, a natural extension of current visa programs, especially
family reunification visas, is the formation of ethnic enclaves. These ethnic enclaves, as
previous literature has shown, can pose serious concerns for policy makers who are afraid
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of the economic and social reactions of natives. Such responses include but are not
limited to: taking flight from the local community, lower political support for public
goods, and a decline of landed social capital and entrenched networks. Furthermore,
some opponents argue that ethnic enclaves stifle the pressure to assimilate,
“Americanize,” and integrate with the general population. The question of how to
measure assimilation is a complicated subject because forms of measurement vary.
Measuring assimilation can involve measuring English language retention, social
mobility over time for first- or second-generation immigrants, amount of time involved in
community activities, diversity of the community in which an immigrant lives, or,
simply, the likelihood of naturalization. It is possible, using these dimensions, to conceive
of immigrants who both have or have not assimilated successfully.
At the same time, ethnic enclaves are not altogether negative developments. The
presence of a mono-ethnic enclave can provide some opportunities for social mobility for
recent immigrants of that ethnic group. The enclaves decrease language barriers while
preserving the relevance of social and cultural skills from the immigrant’s community of
origin. Furthermore, the presence of a critical mass of immigrants of a single ethnic
identity can open economic opportunities for others of that same identity. Opening a
restaurant that serves an array of Ethiopian foods may not be a successful business move
without a nearby ethnic enclave of Ethiopian immigrants that can patronize that
establishment. The presence of ethnic enclaves, in this way, can create economic activity
in at least one way by creating an ethnic subeconomy that, while by no means selfcontained, services a select subgroup of the society. This subeconomy, because it can
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never be truly independent from the broader local or supralocal economy, will likely
generate rents for those who can coordinate across the cultural divides.
The primary question, here, however, is to what extent ethnic enclaves help or
hinder new immigrants hoping to assimilate with the broader population. We have
discussed how enclaves can diminish incentives to assimilate, but the possibility that
enclaves can assist immigrants in slowly transitioning into life in the U.S. has some
theoretical merit. Professors Natasha T. Duncan and Brigitte S. Waldorf find some basis
for this merit in their study “Becoming a U.S. Citizen: The Role of Immigrant Enclaves,”
(2009). This study explores the effect that living in an ethnic enclave of various sizes and
maturities—defined by the aggregate share of immigrants in the enclave that have already
been naturalized—has on the likelihood that an immigrant who is eligible to be
naturalized—has lived in the U.S. for at least 7 years—is naturalized. It finds that of
those immigrants who are eligible for naturalization, those who live in enclaves which are
more mature are more likely to be naturalized than those immigrants who live in enclaves
that are less mature. When the enclave is poorly assimilated, then the size of the enclave
is positively associated with naturalization rate of an immigrant. This means that of the
immature enclaves, the smaller ones will yield immigrants with a higher likelihood of
being naturalized while of the mature enclaves, the larger ones will yield such
immigrants.
Though naturalization rate is by no means a perfect proxy for assimilation, it does
indicate which immigrants have passed certain requirements for citizenship, as
determined by the USCIS, and for which immigrants the barriers to entry for certain
social, welfare, and employment opportunities have disappeared. Place-based visas will
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likely lead to a different flow of immigrants than the flow imposed by the current system,
which often funnels immigrants into gateway cities that already have many immigrants.
This place-based policy has the potential to introduce immigrants into areas with few or
no immigrants of the same ethnic identity in them. This means that immigrants will likely
have to assimilate without some of the cultural supports that ethnic enclaves can provide.
If the goal for local and state governments is to bring in immigrants to contribute to the
long-term health and dynamism of communities, then relevant policy makers will need to
think about how and where they settle place-based immigrants. They will want to strike a
balance between the size and maturity of potential ethnic enclaves to ensure that
immigrants can obtain LPR and then citizenship. Their ability to control such factors will
likely stem from a place-based visa policy’s empowerment of local stakeholders to
determine where place-based immigrants might ultimately settle.
Another point of interest which Duncan and Waldorf raised is the extent to which
government can get involved in the process of assimilation. One reason that they alluded
to for why the quality and size of enclaves mattered to the assimilation process is that
there are not many well-known, long-term assimilation services provided by government.
The brunt of the work done to bring immigrants up to speed with local customs, social
practices, and cultural skills—including the retention of language—is done by civil
society organizations, some smaller local government programs, and the enclaves
themselves. So, if immigrants have to depend in a large part on their enclaves for their
assimilation journeys, it will be easier for them to default to their native cultural and
linguistic practices. It is worth it to local and state governments interested in locally
settling and assimilating immigrants to explore potential interventions or compulsory
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programs which can be designed to immerse immigrants in the local society and help
smoothen the transition process.
Finally, the only addition I would make on the point of assimilation is that local
stakeholders need not attempt to strip immigrants of their individual cultural practices—
doing so may not only be problematic by way of personal liberties, but it may also hinder
adherence to the visa program. As has been demonstrated, ethnic enclaves can be a
smoothing force for immigrants hoping to make a life for themselves in the U.S. It would
benefit policymakers if they can figure out how to provide immigrants with an immersive
experience in the local culture while giving them space to celebrate and take comfort in
the cultural practices with which they grew up.

E. Concerns for the National Legislative Agenda
The final concern posited by place-based immigration is its effect on the national agenda.
It is important to note that this section is not meant to forecast how, if at all, a place-based
visa proposal may or may not pass in Congress. However, it is possible speculate about
how potential ways that both proponents and opponents to immigration might respond to
a place-based visa, given an understanding of the typical concerns which often get
involved in the immigration debate to speculate. Namely, this section entertains the
possibility that both groups—granted, neither or these groups are monoliths—express
some form of disapproval toward a place-based visa proposal.
Why might restrictionists disapprove of this policy? Generally, for many of the
same reasons that we have discussed previously. The primary reason would be that it is
not designed to change any of the current components of the immigration systems which
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restrictionists deride, such as reunification visas or lottery visas. Furthermore, all
conceptions of such a place-based visa policy adds to top-line immigration levels.
Restrictionists would prefer, among other things like a guarantee that immigrants only be
admitted if they are unlikely to compete with native workers, that place-based visas
replace some of the visas that they see as “inefficient” or non-meritocratic rather than add
onto the current visa threshold. Altogether, some restrictionists might see this policy as
adding onto rather than amending an overwhelming visa bureaucracy that they see as
inefficient.
So, why might some immigration proponents disapprove? Funnily enough, for the
exact opposite reason. Some proponents might see this measure as opening the door to
the abolition of what they believe makes the immigration system just and humanitarian.
Some proponents might believe that such visas might be popular enough that they are
expanded at the detriment of existing immigration programs used for humanitarian and
equity purposes. In effect, some proponents might see approval for immigrants as a zerosum game—there is only so much public approval to capture and shifting approval to
meritocratic measures could come at the cost of approval for humanitarian and nonmeritocratic immigration.
Neither of these responses are certain or definitive of either the mentality of all
proponents or all opponents. There are several reasons for immigration proponents and
opponents to appreciate place-based visas—that is what makes it a promising bipartisan
policy. Nonetheless, the policy itself may be bogged down at least for another reason that
we previously discussed: the immigration debate comes with years of political baggage.
There is little reason to believe that a legislative debate on any one immigration proposal
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could take place without summoning the years of polarized dialogue and partisan
proposals from bygone immigration debates. A bipartisan bill focused on establishing a
place-based visa is likely to receive any number of amendments from politicians hoping
to sneak in either incremental or radical immigration reforms. Such reforms would mire
the bill in controversy by putting numerous partisan targets on its back. Realistically,
without some way to address those years of baggage—or to shut down debate on such
matters—it is hard to imagine a debate about place-based visas that focuses solely on its
merits.
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VII.
Conclusion
It seems that among those niche policymakers and policy researchers who have
encountered the proposal to implement place-based visas, the proposal faces optimistic
interest and support. The reason for this support likely stems from the proposal’s ability
to address a grave issue facing numerous communities across the U.S.—and its ability to
do so while appealing to the sentiments and preferences of local stakeholders. As
communities across the U.S. face population decline and aging, the question of how to
maintain the livability and desirability of those communities looms large. Place-based
visas are a compelling policy solution because of their ability to bolster the numerical,
social, and educational stock of local communities to solve the various economic and
social challenges raised by population decline, like depressed real estate prices,
government revenues, and economic activity. A place-based visa policy would also
contribute to the decentralization of both immigration flows and the immigration
bureaucracy by giving state and local officials the power to bring immigrants to their
less-frequently settled communities.
Though the costs of a place-based visa policy have not explicitly been established,
a review of the costs of immigration and place-based policies more broadly seems to
indicate that they a potential place-based visa policy will not come with great costs. The
typical concerns about immigration and its effect on the local community, such as
slowing the growth of real estate values, increasing local political tensions across ethnic
divides, or increasing competition for local native workers can be handled through
specific implementation of the policy. Conceivably, the possible costs of the policy can
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be minimized so long as the policy is implemented with consent and buy-in from local
constituents before offering visas and visas are only offered to those immigrants who will
avoid competing with native workers.
Unfortunately, these assumptions are quite optimistic. It is easy to imagine that
state and local officials, as the policy is currently specified, could allocate visas according
to factors unrelated to one’s ability to fill a local labor gap. If local or state governments
are captured by some preference for immigrants of a certain ethnic or cultural
background, then visas might be allocated in ways which defeat some of the economic
purposes of the visa, like create dynamism through providing visas for technically-skilled
immigrants. Allowing visas to be captured by individuals interested in bolstering
opportunities for family reunification may also introduce local economic complications
which this study does not anticipate. As promising as the proposal for creating placebased visas might seem to some, its ability to achieve its goals will depend on the details
around its implementation and enforcement. Without certain guidelines informed by a
common set of goals, state and local governments will experience disparate political and
economic outcomes.
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